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Abstract
We describe the pension plan features of the states and the largest cities and counties in the U.S.
Unlike in the private sector, deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions are still the norm in the public
sector. However, a few jurisdictions have shifted toward deﬁned contribution (DC) plans as
their primary savings plan, and ﬁscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in
this direction. Holding ﬁxed a public employee’s work and salary history, we show that DB
retirement income replacement ratios vary greatly across jurisdictions. This creates large vari-
ation in workers’ need to save for retirement in other accounts. There is also substantial
heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the savings generated in primary DC plans because
of diﬀerences in the level of mandatory employer and employee contributions. One notable
diﬀerence between public and private sector DC plans is that public sector primary DC plans
are characterized by required employee or employer contributions (or both), whereas private
sector plans largely feature voluntary employee contributions that are supplemented by an
employer match. We conclude by applying lessons from savings behavior in private sector
savings plans to the design of public sector plans.
We thank Gwen Reynolds, Janelle Schlossberger, Jessica Zeng, Arash Alidoust, and John Klopfer for
their help in going through state, county, and city pension documents, calling many public pension
oﬃces, and compiling and analyzing the resulting data. Karl Scholz and the other participants in the
NBER State and Local Pensions Conference provided many helpful comments. Financial support from
the National Institute on Aging (grant nos. R01-AG021650 and P01-AG005842) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors.
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doi:10.1017/S1474747211000114Over the past 30 years, employer-sponsored deﬁned contribution (DC) savings
plans have displaced deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions in the private sector. There were
2.4 active DB participants for each active DC participant in the private sector in 1975,
but these proportions had more than ﬂipped by 2007, when there were 3.4 active DC
participants for each active DB participant (U.S. Department of Labor, Employee
Beneﬁt Security Administration, 2008, 2010). Several factors have been implicated in
this shift, including increased regulatory costs for DB providers following the passage
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, the legislated
creation of an attractive (to employers) alternative to the DB pension through section
401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1978, and workers’ interest in portable
pension beneﬁts as the labor force has become more mobile.
The picture in the public sector is very diﬀerent. In most jurisdictions, a DB
pension is still the primary retirement income beneﬁt oﬀered to employees. However,
some jurisdictions have followed the private sector and shifted towards a DC system.
Going forward, ﬁscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direc-
tion. Even jurisdictions with a primary DB plan currently oﬀer supplemental DC
plans.
The distinction between DB and DC plans is an important one. In a DB plan,
participants have little impact on the income that they will receive in retirement
other than through their choice of when to leave their job. Plan sponsors dictate the
formula that determines the payments to retired participants. Sponsors also decide
with the help of highly trained ﬁnancial professionals how much money to save today
to fund these future payments and where these savings are invested.
In a DC plan, participants usually must choose how much to spend out of their
assets during retirement, how much to contribute to the plan before retirement, and
how to invest plan assets with limited guidance from their employer or plan sponsor.
The consequences of having individuals with low levels of ﬁnancial sophistication
make complicated ﬁnancial decisions has been well documented in the literature:
individuals procrastinate, their savings outcomes are heavily inﬂuenced by plan
design features such as employer-selected defaults, they place too much weight on
information that is not relevant (e.g. past asset returns), and they place too little
weight on information that is relevant (e.g. mutual fund fees).
We begin this paper by surveying the retirement plans oﬀered in the public sector,
evaluating the generosity of the DB plans and describing the types of DC plans that
are available. We ﬁnd that public sector DB plans generally provide high-income
replacement rates during retirement for employees who retire from the public sector
with long tenures, but even within this set of employees, there is a large amount of
heterogeneity in the replacement rate across plans. In contrast, employees who leave
the public sector with shorter tenures are not covered as generously. In public DC
plans, mandatory employee contributions and employer contributions that are not
contingent on employee choices are much more common than in private DC plans,
and these combined contributions are often a large fraction of employee salary. We
conclude by summarizing previous research ﬁndings on employee savings behavior in
private DC plans and discussing how this research points to areas where the design of
public sector pension plans could be improved.
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1.1 DB and DC plans in the public sector
In the USA, there are over 2,500 diﬀerent public employee retirement systems
providing beneﬁts to the over 20 million individuals employed in the public sector.
1
For most of these employees, the primary retirement income beneﬁt is a DB pension
plan. According to Snell (2010a), ‘91 percent of full-time state and local government
employees are covered by a traditional, deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plan.’ Although
DC plans are making some inroads in the public sector, quantifying their importance
is diﬃcult because the data collected on public sector retirement plans have largely
focused on DB plans.
Pensions & Investments has compiled data on the 1,000 largest retirement plan
sponsors (public and private) in the U.S., as measured by assets under management
(Pensions & Investments, 2010a,b). Of the 1,000 largest plans in 2009, 222 are
classiﬁed as public plans.
2 Among these public plans, DB plans predominate: only
6% of total assets under management are in DC plans. But 94 of the 222 largest
public pension plan sponsors have a DC component, and 38 of these plans have over
$1 billion in DC assets.
3
To get a more complete picture of the role of DC plans in the public sector, we
compiled information on the retirement plans oﬀered to new hires in 2010 in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, the 20 largest cities, and the 20 largest counties in the
U.S. (as measured by population).
4 Some jurisdictions have a single plan for most or
all public sector employees, whereas others have separate plans for diﬀerent employee
categories, such as teachers, public safety workers, and elected oﬃcials.
5 In Tables 1
(states plus Washington D.C.) and 2 (counties and cities), we list the plans available
to a general public sector employee. Some plans appear in Tables 1 and 2 multiple
times; for example, a plan that covers workers employed by all levels of government
within a state that contains a top-20 city and a top-20 county would show up three
times as a plan covering state, county, and city employees.
Tables 1 and 2 show that DB plans are the predominant primary
6 retirement plan
at all levels of state and local government. But 11 states and Washington D.C. have
1 The number of retirement systems comes from the U.S. Census Bureau (2008, http://www.census.gov/
govs/retire/2008ret05a.html; accessed 4 August 2010). The total number of retirement systems is com-
prised of 218 state systems, 160 county systems, 2,054 municipal/township systems, and 118 school and
special district systems. The number of public sector employees comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat15.pdf (accessed 5 August 2010).
2 Pensions & Investments classiﬁes plans as being corporate, public, union, or miscellaneous. A handful of
plans classiﬁed as ‘miscellaneous’ appear to be public plans (e.g. the Federal Retirement Thrift plan and
the Illinois State Universities plan). In the numbers reported here, we follow the Pensions & Investments
categorization.
3 By comparison, private sector companies like Apple and 7-Eleven have roughly $1 billion in DC assets
under management and no DB assets.
4 For more information on the legislative history of state deﬁned contribution savings plans, see Snell
(2010b).
5 The determinants of the plan types oﬀered to diﬀerent groups of public employees is a potential area for
future research. For example, do DC plans tend to be oﬀered to employees who are best equipped to
make good choices in them?
6 We deﬁne a primary plan as one that is not optional, and a supplemental plan as one in which partici-
pation is voluntary.
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a hybrid DB/DC plan (which combines a DB component with a DC component that
is distinct from the state’s supplemental DC plans), or a plan that allows employees
to choose a DC or a hybrid DB/DC plan instead of a DB plan. These DC and hybrid
DB/DC oﬀerings are largely recent with all but one being incorporated in the past
15 years.
7 Fewer large cities and counties have a primary plan with a DC component:
only 7 of the 40 jurisdictions in Table 2.
Regardless of the nature of their primary retirement plan, all of the jurisdictions in
Tables 1 and 2 have an optional supplemental DC plan available to employees, and a
Table 1. Primary retirement and savings plans available to newly hired general
state employees
State Primary plan State Primary plan
Alabama DB Montana Choice of DB or DC
Alaska DC Nebraska Cash balance
Arizona DB Nevada DB
Arkansas DB New Hampshire DB
California DB New Jersey DB
Colorado Choice of DB or DC New Mexico DB
Connecticut DB New York DB
Delaware DB North Carolina DB
District of Columbia DC North Dakotaa DB
Florida Choice of DB
or DC
Ohio Choice of DB, DC,
or hybrid DB/DC
Georgia Hybrid DB/DC Oklahoma DB
Hawaii DB Oregon Hybrid DB/DC
Idaho DB Pennsylvania DB
Illinois DB Rhode Island DB
Indiana Hybrid DB/DC South Carolina Choice of DB or DC
Iowa DB South Dakota DB
Kansas DB Tennessee DB
Kentucky DB Texas DB
Louisiana DB Utahb DB
Maine DB Vermont DB
Maryland DB Virginia DB
Massachusetts DB Washington Choice of DB or
hybrid DB/DC
Michigan DC West Virginia DB
Minnesota DB Wisconsin DB
Mississippi DB Wyoming DB
Missouri DB
a North Dakota gives a small group of state employees (<10%) a choice between a DB and a
DC plan.
b Starting in 2011, Utah state employees will have a choice between a hybrid DB/DC plan and
a DC plan.
7 Washington DC made the switch to its deﬁned contribution plan in 1987.
318 John Beshears et al.non-trivial fraction have multiple supplemental options. The need for these sup-
plemental DC plans depends on how well the primary plan is meeting employees’
retirement income needs.
1.2 The adequacy of state-DB pensions
Public sector DB pensions are often perceived by the public as being quite generous.
To see how accurate this perception is, we calculate the extent to which employment
automatically generates an annuity stream of income for a stylized public sector
employee,
8 Joe the Bachelor, in each state, assuming Joe retires on 1 January 2010.
The metric we use is Joe’s replacement rate after taxes and retirement plan con-
tributions: (after-tax automatic retirement annuity income in ﬁrst retirement
year)}(after-tax salary in ﬁnal work yearxmandatory retirement plan contributions
Table 2. Primary retirement and savings plans available to newly hired general
county and city employees
County Primary plan City Primary plan
Los Angeles County, CA DB New York City, NY DB
Cook County, IL DB Los Angeles, CA DB
Harris County, TX Cash balance Chicago, IL DB
Maricopa County, AZ DB Houston, TX DB
Orange County, CA Choice of DB or
hybrid DB/DC
Phoenix DB
San Diego County, CA DB Philadelphia, PA DB
Kings County, NY DB San Antonio, TX Cash balance
Miami-Dade County, FL DB Dallas, TX DB
Dallas County, TX Cash balance San Diego, CA Hybrid DB/DC
Queens County, NY DB San Jose, CA DB
Wayne County, MI Hybrid DB/DC Detroit, MI DB
San Bernardino County, CA DB San Francisco, CA DB
Riverside County, CA DB Jacksonville, FL Choice of DB
or DC
King County, WA Choice of DB or
hybrid DB/DC
Indianapolis, IN Hybrid DB/DC
Broward County, FL DB Austin, TX DB
Clark County, NV DB Columbus, OH Choice of DB, DC,
or Hybrid DB/DC
Santa Clara County, CA DB Fort Worth, TX DB
Tarrant County, TX Cash balance Charlotte, NC DB
New York County, NY DB Memphis, TN DB
Bexar County, TX Cash balance Boston, MA DB
8 The analysis that follows assumes that Joe the Bachelor is a general state employee. We have done the
calculations in Appendix Table B1 assuming that Joe is a K-12 teacher in state, and the qualitative results
are very similar (see Appendix B). Note that in some states, the same pension plan covers both general
public employees and K-12 teachers, whereas in other states these two groups of employees are covered
by separate plans.
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DB component of a state hybrid plan) and Social Security payments in Joe’s
automatic annuity income. Even though Joe is retiring on 1 January 2010, we assume
that he worked his entire career under the pension rules being oﬀered to new hires in
2010.
Beﬁtting his name, Joe has never married and has no dependents. The absence of
spousal labor and pension income means that the automatic replacement rate we
calculate for Joe approximates the ratio of his retirement consumption to his pre-
retirement consumption if he does no saving outside the DB pension both before and
after retirement. Of course, the before-tax generosity of Joe’s state pension beneﬁts
does not depend on his marital status or number of dependents, at least as long as he
is alive.
We assume that Joe has a ﬁnal pre-retirement salary of either $50,000 or $100,000,
and has experienced 1% annual real wage growth up until age 60 and 0% nominal
wage growth until his retirement at age 65. We consider six diﬀerent work histories
for Joe:
(A) Joe retires having worked for 40 years, all of it in the public sector.
(B) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, all of it in the public sector.
(C) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the ﬁrst 5 in the private sector and the last
30 in the public sector.
(D) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the ﬁrst 30 in the private sector and the
last 5 in the public sector.
(E) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the ﬁrst 15 in the private sector and the
last 20 in the public sector.
(F) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the ﬁrst 20 in the public sector and the last
15 in the private sector.
Note that in every scenario, the replacement rate Joe would get later in retirement
could be diﬀerent than our calculations here due to cost-of-living adjustments
(COLAs). Appendix A (available online) includes more details on the assumptions
and methodology we use to calculate Joe’s automatic replacement rate, the values of
the automatic replacement rate we calculate for Joe in each state, each state’s tax
treatment of labor income and pension income, and whether each state’s employees
participate in Social Security.
Table 3 shows summary statistics of the automatic replacement rates, broken out
by Joe’s ﬁnal salary, work history, and the type of plan oﬀered by the state. A state
that oﬀers employees a choice of plans appears in multiple plan categories – once in
each category it oﬀers.
Under most of the scenarios we consider where Joe’s ﬁnal income is $50,000, the
average automatic replacement rate in plans with at least some DB component is
close to or exceeds the 70–75% replacement rate that is often considered adequate.
As a point of comparison, Munnell and Soto (2005) calculate that the median U.S.
single individual who retired with an employer-sponsored pension between 1999 and
2003 receives Social Security plus pension annuity income (assuming all DC assets are
annuitized) equal to 56% of his average income in the highest 5out of the last 10 years
320 John Beshears et al.prior to retirement.
9 Nonetheless, a need for additional savings remains – even for
many public sector employees covered by a DB plan – for several reasons.
First, because the Social Security system is progressive, Joe’s average replacement
rate is decreasing in his ﬁnal salary.
10 For example, when Joe has a 35-year career
Table 3. Joe the bachelor’s automatic retirement income replacement rates:
summary statistics
Work history scenario
A
0 years
private
40 years
public
B
0 years
private
35 years
public
C
5 years
private
30 years
Public
D
30 years
private
5 years
public
E
15 years
private
20 years
public
F
20 years
public
15 years
private
$50,000 ﬁnal salary
DB-only plans
Minimum replacement rate 85% 79% 69% 42% 65% 48%
Mean replacement rate 129% 121% 113% 61% 96% 76%
Maximum replacement rate 163% 150% 138% 74% 122% 98%
Hybrid DB/DC plans
Minimum replacement rate 51% 44% 37% 49% 41% 33%
Mean replacement rate 96% 90% 84% 55% 75% 62%
Maximum replacement rate 125% 118% 111% 66% 95% 79%
DC-only plans
Minimum replacement rate 0% 0% 0% 41% 15% 18%
Mean replacement rate 32% 32% 32% 48% 38% 39%
Maximum replacement rate 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 53%
$100,000 ﬁnal salary
DB-only plans
Minimum replacement rate 86% 80% 70% 34% 63% 49%
Mean replacement rate 120% 111% 101% 50% 83% 66%
Maximum replacement rate 154% 141% 129% 64% 107% 83%
Hybrid DB/DC plans
Minimum replacement rate 53% 46% 38% 38% 43% 35%
Mean replacement rate 84% 78% 72% 44% 64% 54%
Maximum replacement rate 109% 101% 93% 54% 81% 67%
DC-only plans
Minimum replacement rate 0% 0% 0% 32% 15% 18%
Mean replacement rate 24% 24% 24% 37% 30% 31%
Maximum replacement rate 41% 41% 31% 41% 41% 41%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
9 This comparison shows that public sector compensation appears to be more back-loaded than private
sector compensation. It does not show that public sector compensation is more generous than private
sector compensation.
10 The only time Joe’s replacement rate is not aﬀected by his ﬁnal salary is in states with DC-only plans
whose employees do not participate in Social Security. The replacement rate in these states is 0%
regardless of Joe’s income.
Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans 321entirely spent in the public sector, his replacement rate in DB-only plans is 10%
points lower on average with a $100,000 ﬁnal income than with a $50,000 ﬁnal
income.
Second, in the DB-only plans and the hybrid DB/DC plans, Joe’s automatic re-
placement rate falls if he has spent less time working in the public sector. This is
because the typical DB pension formula increases beneﬁts with years of service.
11 If
Joe’s last job is in the public sector with a ﬁnal income of $50,000, his average re-
placement rate in a DB-only plan decreases by 8% points as his years of public sector
work decrease from 40 to 35, by another 8% points as his tenure decreases from 35 to
30, and by another 17% points as his tenure decreases from 30 to 20. If Joe works
only 5 years in the public sector, there are many states whose DB systems do not give
Joe any automatic annuity because he does not satisfy the plan vesting requirements.
Thus, Joe’s automatic annuity income would come solely from Social Security. In
most of these states, Joe would receive a refund of his contributions to the state
pension system if the system requires employee contributions.
12
Third, conditional on working partly in the public sector and partly in the private
sector, Joe has a lower replacement rate if he ends his career in the private sector than
if he ends his career in the public sector. This is because the DB pension formulas are
a function of Joe’s nominal ﬁnal average salary in the public sector. For example, if
Joe retires with a ﬁnal average salary of $50,000 and works 20 years in the public
sector and 15 years in the private sector, his average DB-only replacement rate is
20% points higher if he retires from the public sector than if he retires from the
private sector (96% versus 76%).
Fourth, even holding ﬁxed Joe’s ﬁnal income and work history, there is substantial
heterogeneity in his automatic replacement rate across states. For example, with a
ﬁnal average salary of $50,000 and a 35-year career spent entirely in the public sector,
the average replacement rate across all DB-only plans is 121%. If Joe worked in
Pennsylvania, his replacement rate would be a much higher 150%. But if Joe worked
in Maine, his replacement rate would be only 79%. Joe’s average automatic re-
placement rate in states with hybrid DB/DC plans is lower on average than in the
states with DB-only plans – 90% versus 121% – as would be expected, since it is
intended that Joe fund some of his retirement with assets in the DC component of
these plans. There is also substantial variation in Joe’s automatic replacement rate
within the small number of hybrid DB/DC plans, ranging from a low of 44% in Ohio
to a high of 118% in Oregon. In DC-only plans, Joe’s replacement rate is either 0%
(in states whose newly hired employees do not participate in Social Security
13)o r
around 50% (the replacement rate that he gets from Social Security alone after
taxes).
11 In some states, the DB replacement rate is capped, so additional years of service do not increase pension
beneﬁts after some point.
12 In most states with DB plans, if Joe leaves public sector employment before he is vested, only his
contributions are refunded. He does not receive any investment return on his contributions nor any of
the employer contributions made on his behalf.
13 Newly hired state employees in Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio
do not make Social Security contributions, and their employer does not either. Consequently, their
public sector earnings history is not counted in determining their Social Security beneﬁts.
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mulates beneﬁts for his entire career under the rules in place for employees newly
hired today. How has this automatic replacement rate changed over time? Figure 1
plots one measure of this change for Joe if he works his entire 35-year career in the
public sector (work history B above) and has a $50,000 ﬁnal salary. The vertical axis
is the highest automatic replacement rate Joe could get in his state if he spent his
entire career under the rules for today’s new hires. The horizontal axis is the most
generous automatic replacement rate Joe could get if he spent his career under the
rules actually experienced by employees who started working in 1975 and retired at
the beginning of 2010.
Most states are fairly close to the 45-degree line, indicating that the automatic
replacement rate has not changed much over time, at least for employees who spend
their entire careers in the public sector. The few substantial changes have mostly
lowered the automatic replacement rate; conditional upon changing, the average
change is a 10% point decrease.
Several states have decreased the generosity of their DB pension in ways that do
not show up in Figure 1. For example, an increase in the years of service at which
employees vest would reduce the automatic replacement ratio of employees who leave
the public sector with years of service between the old and the new vesting thresholds.
Many states have adopted ‘anti-spiking provisions’ to combat the practice of arti-
ﬁcially inﬂating pay in the ﬁnal year or two before retirement by taking extremely
high amounts of overtime or getting short-term ‘promotions’ into higher-paying
positions. Since pension formulas depend on some measure of ﬁnal average pay,
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Figure 1. State retirement plan replacement rates over time.
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14 We have assumed that Joe’s pay is
ﬂat during his last 5 years before retirement, and so the automatic replacement rates
that we calculate are not inﬂuenced by spiking. States are also reducing the generosity
of their retiree health insurance, a valuable beneﬁt that we do not incorporate into
our replacement rate calculation. The current ﬁscal situation facing many jurisdic-
tions will likely precipitate many more such changes. To the extent that pensions are
becoming less generous in some of the less visible ways discussed above, this may
increase the need for supplemental DC savings.
1.3 The adequacy of state-DC pensions
The adequacy of DC savings plans is more diﬃcult to assess than that of DB plans
because their adequacy often depends signiﬁcantly on participant behavior: Are
employees participating, how much are they contributing, and what type of asset
allocation do they choose? In most private sector 401(k) plans, there are many ways
employees can fall short (Munnell and Sunde ´ n, 2004): they can delay enrolling in the
plan, choose a contribution rate that is too low to generate the necessary resources
to maintain consumption in retirement, or choose an inappropriate asset allocation
(e.g. investing heavily in employer stock, investing in high-fee funds, or investing in a
manner that does not match their risk tolerance).
Table 4 lists some characteristics of states’ primary DC plans. Optional sup-
plementary DC plans and the DC component of hybrid DB/DC plans are not in-
cluded in the table. In contrast to most private sector DC plans, plan contributions
are mandatory for most state employees whose primary plan is the DC plan.
15 Thus,
in the three states whose only primary plan is the DC plan, contributions to the DC
plan are automatic and employees cannot opt out. In the states that allow employees
to choose a DC plan as their primary plan, the default primary plan is the DB plan
(or the hybrid DB/DC plan in the State of Washington), and so mandatory DC
plan contributions do not commence unless the employee actively enrolls in the DC
plan.
In the private sector, most DC plans are funded by elective employee contributions
and an employer contribution that depends on the employee’s contribution (e.g. the
employer will match 50% of employee contributions up to 3% of pay). The contri-
bution rules in state DC plans are usually very diﬀerent. Only Michigan allows
variable employee contributions that are matched by the employer, as is the norm in
the private sector. Instead, state DC plans usually oﬀer an employer contribution that
is not contingent on employee contributions, ranging from 4% of salary in Michigan
to 10.15% of salary in Colorado. Most also ﬁx the employee contribution at a level
between 4% and 10% of salary, although two jurisdictions (Washington DC and
Florida) do not allow employee contributions at all.
14 In practice, anti-spiking provisions cap the annual salary growth that is used to calculate a worker’s
pension beneﬁt.
15 States often exempt some groups of employees from retirement plan participation, but these employee
groups tend to be small (e.g. temporary or part-time workers).
324 John Beshears et al.Table 4. Characteristics of state primary DC retirement savings plans
States with primary DC plan only
Participation Employee contributions Employer contributions Investment options Vesting
Alaska Automatic and
immediate
Mandatory 8% 5% non-contingent
contribution
10 funds, target date
fund default
100% after 5 years
0–0–25–50–75–100
Michigan Automatic and
immediate
Optional up to 100% 4% non-contingent contribution;
100% match on employee
contributions up to 3% of pay
22 funds, ﬁxed
income default
100% after 4 years
0–0–50–75–100
Washington DC Automatic after
1 year service
None 5% non-contingent contribution 17 funds, target date
fund default
100% after 5 years
0–0–20–40–60–100
States with choice of primary plan that includes DC-only option
Participation
Employee
contributions Employer Contributions Investment Options Vesting
Colorado Opt-in Mandatory 8% if DC
plan chosen
10.15% non-contingent
contribution
21 funds, balanced fund default 100% after 5 years
50–60–70–80–90–100
Florida Opt-in None 9% non-contingent
contribution
20 funds, balanced fund default 100% after 1 year 0–100
Montana Opt-in Mandatory 6.9% if
DC plan chosen
4.19% non-contingent
contribution
15 funds, balanced fund default 100% after 5 years
0–0–0–0–0–100
North Dakotaa Opt-in Mandatory 4% if
DC plan chosen
4.12% non-contingent
contribution
20 funds+brokerage window,
default unspeciﬁed
100% after 4 years
0–0–50–75–100
South Carolina Opt-in Mandatory 6.5% if
DC plan chosen
5% non-contingent
contribution
83 funds, target date default fund Immediate
Ohio Opt-in Mandatory 10% if
DC plan chosen
8.73% non-contingent
contribution
16 funds, target date default fund 100% after 5 years
0–20–40–60–80–100
Utah (starts 2011) NA Allowed 10% non-contingent
contribution
NA 100% after 4 years
a North Dakota gives a small group of state employees (<10%) a choice between a DB and a DC plan.
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5One area where public and private sector DC plans are similar is the investment
options oﬀered. The number of investment options ranges from 10 to the low 20s
with only one exception, South Carolina, which has four diﬀerent investment fund
managers and a total of 85 funds. All of the fund menus have investment options that
span the risk-expected return spectrum, and most include target date funds. The
default fund is either an age-appropriate target date fund or a balanced fund with the
exception of Michigan, where the default is a ﬁxed income fund. This is in line with
the private sector, which has also moved toward target date and balanced fund de-
faults that satisfy the Qualiﬁed Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) guidelines of
the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
Employees’ own contributions are always immediately vested in state DC plans.
The vesting of employer contributions varies across jurisdictions, from immediate
vesting in South Carolina to cliﬀ vesting after 5 years in Montana. Employees in most
states become incrementally vested in their employer contributions over time, until
they are fully vested after 4 or 5 years. The range of state vesting schedules mirrors
what we observe in private sector plans.
Participants in state DC plans are less likely than participants in private sector DC
plans to end up with extremely low retirement savings, since most states impose high
minimum contribution rates. Colorado and Ohio require combined employer plus
employee contribution rates in excess of 18%. Four other states mandate combined
contribution rates greater than or equal to 10%. But some states have rather
low mandatory combined contribution rates. Washington DC contributes only 5%
of salary and allows no employee contributions, and North Dakota’s combined
mandatory contribution is 8.12% of salary, with no possibility for employees to
contribute more. Michigan’s minimum mandatory contribution rate is 4%, but em-
ployees can accumulate more by making additional optional employee contributions
and earning the accompanying employer match.
2. Behavioral economics and retirement savings
We now turn to a brief summary of the behavioral economics literature on retirement
savings. In Section 3, we will apply these research ﬁndings to the public sector
retirement plans that we have described in Section 1.
Several recent papers document a pervasive lack of ﬁnancial literacy in the U.S.
population (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007; Applied Research and Consulting,
2009; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Lusardi et al., 2010). This low level of ﬁnancial
literacy carries over to the speciﬁc domain of employer-sponsored retirement plans.
Gustman et al. (2007) and Chan and Stevens (2008) show that many Health and
Retirement Survey respondents do not understand important features of their re-
tirement plan, including whether the plan is a DB or a DC plan, the age at which they
qualify for full beneﬁts, and the relationship between continued work and future
beneﬁts. Choi et al. (forthcoming) similarly show that many employees in one DC
savings plan do not know their employer match. Finally, Brown and Weisbenner
(2009) document that individuals participating in the State Universities Retirement
System of Illinois are confused about which plan option best meets their needs.
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especially those with little ﬁnancial expertise and experience. Saving and investing
for retirement can be especially daunting, as it involves making large long-term
commitments in a domain in which many individuals will never develop signiﬁcant
expertise. Learning is hindered by the fact that each individual goes through the
lifecycle savings problem only once, outcomes are realized with substantial delay and
noise, and the rapid pace of ﬁnancial innovation renders previously acquired
knowledge obsolete.
The consequences for savings plan outcomes have been well documented. Several
broad patterns of behavior emerge from the literature. First, individuals procrasti-
nate when faced with complicated choices. In the context of retirement saving, this
often implies not saving at all. Carroll et al. (2009) document substantial procrasti-
nation in 401(k) savings plan enrollment in a large private sector savings plan, even
though the costs of delay can be substantial (Choi et al., forthcoming). Conversely,
Choi et al. (2009a) and Beshears et al. (2010a) show that simplifying the savings plan
enrollment process leads to sizeable increases in participation.
Second, savings and investment outcomes are heavily inﬂuenced by plan design
features that matter little in standard economic models. The best evidence on this
front is the sensitivity of outcomes to the plan defaults. Savings plan participation
increases greatly following employer adoption of automatic enrollment, which
changes the plan default from non-participation to participation, and contribution
rates and asset allocations shift toward the automatic enrollment defaults (Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2004b, 2006; Beshears et al., 2008). Allowing employees
to choose automatic future contribution rates increases leads to sizeable future in-
creases in savings (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). Portfolios are more heavily invested in
employer stock when the employer match is invested by default in employer stock
(Benartzi, 2001; Choi et al., 2009b). The fraction of pension beneﬁciaries choosing a
joint and survivor annuity increased substantially when this option became the legal
default for married individuals (Holden and Nicholson, 1998; Saku, 2005).
Defaults are not the only plan design feature that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences savings
and investment outcomes. In plans without an employer match, discretionary em-
ployee contribution rates are inﬂuenced by whether mandatory contributions are
labeled as employee or employer contributions (Card and Ransom, 2011). Several
authors have found that asset allocation choices are sensitive to the structure of the
investment menu (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown et al., 2007; Karlsson et al.,
2007) and the form on which individuals must indicate their choices (Benartzi and
Thaler, 2007).
Third, individuals pay too much attention to irrelevant information and too little
attention to relevant information. For example, individuals chase past returns in both
their asset allocation choices (Benartzi, 2001; Choi et al., 2004b, 2010; Calvet et al.,
2009) and contribution rate choices (Choi et al., 2009) while paying too little attention
to mutual fund fees (Choi et al., 2010).
A fourth pattern is a reliance on heuristics and rules of thumb in decision making.
For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) document what they call ‘naı¨ve diversiﬁ-
cation’: individuals diversify by investing in several diﬀerent mutual funds, but they
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making their choices.
16 Choi et al. (2006) show that employees disproportionately
choose 401(k) contribution rates that are divisible by 5.
Finally, individuals do a poor job of integrating various aspects of their ﬁnancial
lives; rather, they appear to engage in mental accounting, making decisions in each
subset of their portfolio without considering their choices in other subsets (Choi et al.,
2009b; Card and Ransom, 2011).
This long list of biases has complex implications for the overall adequacy of
retirement savings. Depending on the institutional environment, some behavioral
biases will generate excessive accumulation of retirement wealth, whereas other
biases will generate inadequate accumulation of retirement wealth.
To illustrate the case of excess accumulation, consider an individual who has a
large DB pension claim, but fails to fully account for that claim when making re-
tirement savings decisions. For example, the individual might mentally segregate
their DB claim and follow a simple heuristic in choosing an active savings rate in his
DC account, for instance, save up to the match threshold, which is 6% of income in a
typical private sector DC plan. Assuming that the employee’s contributions are par-
tially matched, the total implicit saving rate could far exceed 20% once the DB
accumulation and Social Security are also taken into account. In this scenario, the
individual might save far too much, particularly if he has a low level of labor income
and a correspondingly high Social Security replacement rate. Likewise, consider a
completely passive individual who works for an employer with a DB plan and also a
DC plan that has automatic enrollment, an employer match, and automatic contri-
bution escalation. In this setting, such a household might also end up saving far too
much.
On the other hand, the passive behavior noted above could lead to insuﬃcient
retirement wealth accumulation in other contexts. For example, a largely passive
individual who works for an employer with neither a DB nor a DC savings plan could
save far too little.
Behavioral biases therefore predict a mixed picture of heterogeneous savings out-
comes, with this heterogeneity driven by the interaction between behavioral biases
(like passivity or mental accounting) and the individual’s institutional environment.
Researchers who study savings adequacy have reached diﬀering conclusions about
the extent to which individuals are ﬁnancially prepared for retirement. Some argue
that individuals are largely well positioned (e.g. Engen et al., 1999; Scholz et al.,
2006), while others conclude that most individuals are falling short of where they
need to be (Munnell et al., 2007).
3. Implications for public sector retirement plans
What are the implications of these behavioral patterns for thinking about how well
public sector retirement plans meet the retirement income needs of public sector
employees?
16 However, see the critique of this result by Huberman and Jiang (2006).
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DB plans have been characterized as being less complicated than DC plans for their
participants. Indeed, DC plans demand – or at least allow – a substantial amount of
individual autonomy, whereas DB plans require almost no choices by participants
before retirement. But there are many complicated features of DB plans that have
implications for how employees use the supplemental DC savings plans they are
oﬀered.
The formulas determining DB pension payouts seem relatively straightforward on
the surface: ﬁnal average salary multiplied by years of service multiplied by a retire-
ment factor. But these formulas often have complicated wrinkles, such as limits on
the growth in ﬁnal wages that will count in the formula, future COLAs that are hard
to value, and rules about the combination of age and years of service that must be
attained to receive a full beneﬁt. Many individuals have misconceptions about their
retirement beneﬁts, which may aﬀect their choices about how much to save in their
supplemental DC plans.
DB plans reward tenure, since most payout formulas depend directly on years of
service and some measure of ﬁnal average pay, which is itself often related to tenure.
Individuals who leave the public sector with relatively low levels of tenure will be
entitled to very little or nothing at all. Although the common perception is that public
sector workers are generally long-term employees, a recent Maine task force report
claims that over half of public sector workers in Maine leave the public sector before
reaching the 5 years of service necessary to vest (Maine URP Task Force, 2010).
If this is true in other states as well, then more attention probably needs to be paid to
supplemental DC plans in the public sector.
Finally, the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) greatly complicates estimating
the level of Social Security income that employees of six states (Colorado, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio) will receive. While employed by these
states, employees make no contributions to Social Security, and neither does their
employer. Consequently, earnings from employment in these states are not counted
towards determining Social Security beneﬁts. But some employees have long enough
careers to qualify for Social Security beneﬁts in addition to their state pension. The
WEP reduces Social Security payments to these employees. As explained on the
Social Security web site:
‘Before 1983, people who worked mainly in a job not covered by Social Security had
their Social Security beneﬁts calculated as if they were long-term, low-wage workers.
They had the advantage of receiving a Social Security beneﬁt representing a higher
percentage of their earnings, plus a pension from a job where they did not pay Social
Security taxes. Congress passed the Windfall Elimination Provision to remove that
advantage’.
(Source: http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10045.html, accessed 7 August 2010.)
The annual statements that Social Security sends to participants projecting
their future beneﬁts do not account for the eﬀects of the WEP, and so aﬀected
state employees may mistakenly believe that they are entitled to higher Social
Security beneﬁts than they will in fact receive, altering their savings and retirement
decisions.
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adds yet another layer of complexity. Employees do not typically have the option of
procrastinating indeﬁnitely, because there is a deadline by which a decision must be
made.
17 But in fact, the decision does not need to be explicitly made, since the
employerspeciﬁes adefaultplan for individualswho donot state apreference.Table 5
lists the states that oﬀer a choice of primary plan, which plan is their default option,
and the fraction of new employees who end up in each option in the states from which
we were able to get that information. The default is the DB plan in all of the choice
states except for Washington, where the default is a hybrid DB/DC plan. Consistent
with previous research, the large majority of employees – 79% to 87% – end up in
whichever plan is the default.
Beshears et al. (2008) discuss several reasons why defaults are powerful. One may
be particularly relevant here: the perception that the default is the employer-endorsed
option. Most workers probably lack the knowledge necessary to map each retirement
plan to their preferences, and so the default may be particularly likely to be perceived
as the correct course of action. Yang (2005), Brown and Weisbenner (2009), and
Goda and Manchester (2010) all document strong default eﬀects among employees
Table 5. Plan defaults in states that oﬀer a choice of primary plan
State Retirement plan options
Fraction of new employees
electing each option
Colorado DB (default) –
DC –
Florida DB (default) 79%a
DC 21%a
Montana DB (default) –
DC –
North Dakota DB (default) –
DC –
Ohio DB (default) 87%b
Hybrid DB/DC 5.6%b
DC 7.4%b
South Carolina DB (default) y85%c
DC y15%c
Washington Hybrid DB/DC (default) 81%d
DB 19%d
We calculate the fraction of new employees electing each option from the annual reports of the
states that report active members by year for each plan.
a Florida: the fraction of new employees hired between 2000 and 2009.
b Ohio: the fraction of new employees hired between 2003 and 2008.
c South Carolina: rough estimate from a state employee in the South Carolina pension oﬃce
(personal communication).
d Washington: the fraction of new employees hired between 2002 and 2008.
17 For the states with a plan choice in Table 1, employees have between 30 days and 12 months to opt out of
the default plan.
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and Weisbenner had a choice among three diﬀerent plans). In the organization
studied by Goda and Manchester, the default diﬀered by age: employees older than
45 had a DB plan default, while employees younger than 45 had a DC plan default.
Employees who are just above the age-45 cutoﬀ are 60% points more likely to be in
the DB plan than employees who are just below the age-45 cutoﬀ. Goda and
Manchester’s analysis suggests that following the age-based default rule was close to
optimal ex ante for employees. However, even if the age-based default rule was op-
timal on average, there could be many employees who are swept up into a plan that is
not optimal for them. The organizations studied by Yang (2005) and Brown and
Weisbenner (2009) designated the DB plan as the default for all employees. Like
Goda and Manchester, Yang ﬁnds that the default is very inﬂuential, especially for
employees younger than 30, whom she calculates are least likely to beneﬁt from being
in the DB plan.
18 Brown and Weisbenner also ﬁnd that the default is powerful, and
employees who opt out of the default tend to choose a dominated non-default plan.
Instead of having a default, employees could be required to actively choose their
primary plan before a deadline. Carroll et al. (2009) study such a regime in a private
401(k) plan that required employees to actively choose a (possibly zero) contribution
rate within 30 days of hire. This approach prevents employees from ﬁnding them-
selves in an inappropriate plan through passivity, but also places a heavy burden on
employees to gather enough information to make a wise decision. Thus, active
decision regimes are best accompanied by mechanisms that help employees quickly
and easily understand their options.
An interesting design choice is whether to make the plan choice reversible. In some
states, the plan choice is irreversible, whereas in other states, employees have one or
more opportunities to switch between plans. Reversibility may complicate the de-
cision-making task even further, and could cause employees to make their initial
choice less thoughtfully. On the other hand, ﬂexibility is valuable if employees make a
mistake in their initial choice, or if their circumstances change.
All states with a DC-only plan remove at least one layer of complexity by auto-
matically enrolling employees in the DC plan with an employer contribution that is
not contingent on employee choices. Most go a step further by also requiring a ﬁxed
contribution on the part of employees, some at relatively high rates. The default
investment fund in these plans is typically a target date fund. Although target date
funds are not perfect, they are diversiﬁed across multiple asset classes and auto-
matically become less risky as the participant ages.
19
The complexity in public DC plans comes from the optional supplemental savings
plans, in which employees must determine their appropriate contribution rates and
asset allocations. As noted in Section 1, not all DB and primary DC plans generate
high-retirement-income replacement rates for all public sector workers, resulting in
18 This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Beshears et al. (2010b), who ﬁnd that employees who accept
a sub-optimal default contribution rate tend to be of lower socio-economic status.
19 Mitchell et al. (2007) ﬁnd that 401(k) participants who are 100% invested in a target date fund tend to
have the target date fund as their asset allocation default. Nessmith and Utkus (2008) ﬁnd that just over
half of target date fund 401(k) investors allocate their entire 401(k) to that one target date fund, whereas
the remaining target date investors combine the target date fund with other investment options.
Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans 331the need to utilize these supplemental plans. Some aspects of the supplemental plans’
complexity seem unnecessary. For example, a state may have one provider adminis-
tering its primary DC plan with one set of investment options, another provider with
a completely diﬀerent set of investment options managing its ﬁrst supplemental plan,
and yet another provider with a third set of investment options for its second sup-
plemental plan. If there are multiple supplemental plans, employees who want to
augment their primary beneﬁts would have to choose which supplemental plan to use
ﬁrst. Like the choice between a DB and a DC plan discussed above, this is not
necessarily a straightforward decision.
Another source of complexity in both DB and DC plans is the process of trans-
forming accumulated beneﬁts into retirement income. Most private sector DC plans
do not have an annuitization option within the plan, and so accumulated balances are
not automatically converted into a payment stream upon retirement. Rather, retirees
must take some action to convert their plan balances into an annuity, or they must
self-manage spending down their wealth in retirement. In the private sector DC plans
that do oﬀer an annuity option, the take-up rate of this option is quite low. The low
rate of annuitization both within and outside of DC plans is often referred to as the
‘annuity puzzle’ because it goes against theoretical predictions that individuals
should have a strong demand for annuities to insure against longevity risk (Yaari,
1965; Brown, 2007).
20 Within-plan annuitization options are somewhat more preva-
lent in the public sector than in the private sector. Of the 12 states that have a DC-
only or a hybrid DB/DC plan, half have an option within the plan for employees to
annuitize their wealth upon retirement.
21
In contrast, both private and public sector DB plans have traditionally paid out
accrued beneﬁts as either a single or as a joint and survivor life annuity. But many DB
plans have started to oﬀer a lump sum payout option. Mitchell (1999) reports that in
1991, when aggregate data on lump sum payout options were ﬁrst collected, only
14% of private sector DB plan participants had the option of a lump sum payout. By
2005, more than half (52%) of private sector DB plan participants had a lump sum
option available (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007).
Anecdotal discussions with those in the pension and retirement savings industry
suggest that when a lump sum option is available, the majority of participants elect
the lump sum. So the trend in private sector DB plans is towards decreased levels of
annuitization. Public sector DB plans are still more aggressive in promoting annui-
tization. Only a third of states allow employees the option of taking a lump sum
withdrawal, and in most of these, the lump sum payout is limited to the equivalent of
a few years of annuitized beneﬁts.
22
20 Chalmers and Reuter (2009) and Previtero (2010) show that annuitization rates vary negatively with
recent equity market returns, perhaps reﬂecting shifts in workers’ conﬁdence in their ability to generate
high returns by investing their savings on their own. Hu and Scott (2007), Brown et al. (2008), and
Agnew et al. (2008) argue that annuity demand is aﬀected by framing, i.e. the arbitrary mental ﬁlter
through which individuals interpret the annuity choice.
21 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Washington have a mechanism for converting DC balances into
an annuity. Michigan facilitates annuitization of DC balances through a platform that gives participants
competing quotes from several diﬀerent annuity providers.
22 Retirees may take their entire beneﬁt as a lump sum in Delaware, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota. In Oregon and Wisconsin, retirees may only take their entire beneﬁt as a lump sum if the
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In this paper, we have provided an overview of the public sector pension landscape
in the U.S. Although DB plans remain the predominant primary plan, some
jurisdictions – particularly at the state level – have opted to oﬀer only a DC plan or
have given employees a choice among a DB, DC, and hybrid DB/DC plans. All
jurisdictions have one or more supplemental DC plans available to employees.
We document substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the extent to which
their DB, DC, or hybrid DB/DC plans automatically set employees up for high-
retirement-income replacement rates. Employees in plans that will provide them with
less automatic savings probably need to engage in some supplemental savings in
order to maintain their standard of living in retirement. The need for supplemental
savings is particularly high for low-tenured workers who may not vest in a DB plan or
who may only partially vest in a DC plan.
We conclude by discussing how recent behavioral economics research on savings
and investing behavior applies to the institutions and choices that employees face in
public sector retirement plans. Most public sector DC plans do not allow employees
any choice in how much gets contributed to the plan, and employees’ assets are
directed by default into target date retirement funds. By limiting the amount of choice
employees have in the primary DC plan, public sector retirement plan designers
are likely to have eliminated most of the left tail of savings outcomes that arise in
private sector DC plans due to ﬁnancial illiteracy, procrastination, and time-incon-
sistent tastes for immediate consumption gratiﬁcation; although it is unknown how
large of a welfare cost reducing choice exacts due to rational employees’ reduced
ability to smooth marginal utility intertemporally. Public sector supplemental DC
plans are typically more complicated and confusing than those found in the private
sector, since there are often multiple supplemental plans oﬀered, and since each
supplemental plan may be operated by a diﬀerent ﬁnancial services company. More
research is needed to determine why the supplemental plans are structured as they are
and how variation in their structure aﬀects how well public sector employees do when
faced with these types of choices.
References
Agnew, J. R., Anderson, L. R., Gerlach, J. R. and Szykman, L. R. (2008) Who chooses
annuities: an experimental investigation of gender, framing and defaults. American
Economic Review, 98(2): 418–422.
Applied Research and Consulting (2009) Financial Capability in the United States, [online].
Available at http://www.ﬁnrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/
documents/foundation/p120536.pdf (accessed 9 August 2010).
Benartzi, S. (2001) Excessive extrapolation and the allocation of 401(k) accounts to company
stock? Journal of Finance, 56(5): 1747–1764.
Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R. H. (2001) Naive diversiﬁcation strategies in retirement saving plans.
American Economic Review, 91(1): 79–98.
monthly annuity beneﬁt to which they are entitled is below a low threshold. The following states allow a
partial lump sum payout: Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota,
Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans 333Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R. H. (2007) Heuristics and biases in retirement savings behavior.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 81–104.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2008) The importance of default
options for retirement saving outcomes: evidence from the united states. In Kay, S. J. and
Sinha, T. (eds), Lessons from Pension Reform in the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 59–87.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2010a) Simpliﬁcation and saving.
NBER Working Paper No. 12659.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2010b) The Limitations of Defaults.
Harvard University Working paper.
Brown, J. R. (2007) Rational and behavioral perspectives on the role of annuities in retirement
planning. NBER Working Paper No. 13537.
Brown, J. R., Kling, J. R., Mullainathan, S. and Wrobel, M. V. (2008) Why don’t people insure
late-life consumption? A framing explanation of the under-annuitization puzzle. American
Economic Review, 98(2): 304–309.
Brown, J. R., Liang, N. and Weisbenner, S. (2007) Individual account investment options and
portfolio choice: behavioral lessons from 401(k) plans. Journal of Public Economics, 91(10):
1992–2013.
Brown, J. R. and Weisbenner, S. (2009) Who chooses deﬁned contribution plans? In Brown,
J. R., Liebman, J. B. and Wise, D. A. (eds), Social Security Policy in a Changing
Environment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 131–161.
Calvet, L. E., Campbell, J. Y. and Sodini, P. (2009) Measuring the ﬁnancial sophistication of
households. American Economic Review, 99(2): 393–398.
Card, D. and Ransom, M. (2011) Pension plan characteristics and framing eﬀects in employee
savings behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1): 228–243.
Carroll, G. D., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C. and Metrick, A. (2009) Optimal
defaults and active decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4): 1639–1674.
Chalmers, J. and Reuter, J. (2009) How do retirees value life annuities? Evidence from public
employees. NBER Working Paper No. 15608.
Chan, S. and Stevens, A. H. (2008) What you don’t know can’t help you: worker knowledge
and retirement decision-making. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2): 253–266.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2004a) Plan design and 401(k) savings outcomes.
National Tax Journal, 57(2): 275–298.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2009a) Reducing the complexity costs of 401(k)
participation through quick enrollment. In Wise, D. A. (ed.), Developments in the Economics
of Aging. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 57–85.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2009b) Mental accounting in portfolio choice:
evidence from a ﬂypaper eﬀect. American Economic Review, 99(5): 2085–2095.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2010) Why does the law of one price fail? An
experiment on index mutual funds. Review of Financial Studies, 23(4): 1405–1432.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (forthcoming) $100 Bills on the sidewalk: sub-
optimal investment in 401(k) plans. Review of Economics and Statistics. doi:10.1162/
REST_a_00100.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C. and Metrick, A. (2004b) Employees’ investment de-
cisions about company stock. In Mitchell, O. S. and Utkus, S. P. (eds), Pension Design and
Structure. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 121–136.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C. and Metrick, A. (2006) Saving for retirement on the
path of least resistance. In McCaﬀrey, E. J. and Slemrod, J. (eds), Behavioral Public Finance:
Toward a New Agenda. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 304–351.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C. and Metrick, A. (2009) Reinforcement learning and
savings behavior. Journal of Finance, 64(6): 2515–2534.
Engen, E. M., Gale, W. G. and Uccello, C. R. (1999) The adequacy of retirement saving.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 65–188.
334 John Beshears et al.Goda, G. S. and Manchester, C. F. (2010) Incorporating employee heterogeneity into default
rules for retirement plan selection. NBER Working Paper No. 16099.
Gustman, A. L., Steinmeier, T. L. and Tabatabai, N. (2007) Imperfect knowledge of plan type.
NBER Working Paper No. 13379.
Holden, K. C. and Nicholson, S. (1998) Selection of a joint-and-survivor pension. Institute for
Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 1175–98. University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Hu, W. Y. and Scott, J. S. (2007) Behavioral obstacles in the annuity market. Financial
Analysts Journal, 63(6): 71–82.
Huberman, G. and Jiang, W. (2006) Oﬀering vs. choice by 401(k) plan participants: equity
exposure and number of funds. Journal of Finance, 61(2): 763–801.
Karlsson, A., Massa, M. and Simonov, A. (2007) Pension portfolio choice and menu exposure.
In Mitchell, O. S., Soldo, B. J. and Madrian, B. C. (eds), Redeﬁning Retirement: How Will
Boomers Fare? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248–271.
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2006) Financial literacy and planning: implications for
retirement wellbeing. Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2006–1.
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2007) Financial literacy and retirement preparedness: evidence
and implications for ﬁnancial education. Business Economics, 42(1): 35–44.
Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O. S. and Curto, V. (2010) Financial literacy among the young. Journal
of Consumer Aﬀairs, 44(2), 358–380.
Lusardi, A. and Tufano, P. (2009) Debt literacy, ﬁnancial experiences, and overindebtedness.
NBER Working Paper No. 14808.
Madrian, B. C. and Shea, D. F. (2001) The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation
and savings behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4): 1149–1187.
Maine Uniﬁed Retirement Plan Task Force (2010) Task Force Study and Report: Maine State
Employee and Teacher Uniﬁed Retirement Plan. MainePERS.
Mitchell, O. S. (1999) New trends in pension beneﬁt and retirement provisions. NBER
Working Paper No. 7381.
Mitchell, O. S., Mottola, G. R., Utkus, S. P. and Yamaguchi, T. (2007) The dynamics of life-
cycle investing in 401(k) plans. Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2007–28.
Munnell, A. H. and Soto, M. (2005) What replacement rates do households actually experience
in retirement? Boston College Center for Retirement Research Working Paper No. 2005–10.
Munnell, A. H. and Sunde ´ n, A. (2004) Coming up Short: The Challenge of 401(k) Plans.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
Munnell, A. H., Webb, A. and Golub-Sass, F. (2007) Is there really a retirement saving crisis?
An NRRI analysis. Boston College Center for Retirement Research Issue Brief No. 7–11.
Nessmith, W. E. and Utkus, S. P. (2008) Target-date funds: plan and participation adoption in
2007. Vanguard Center for Retirement Research, 33: 1–16.
Pensions & Investments (2010a) The P&I 1000: Largest Retirement Funds. Data set available
online at http://www.pionline.com/section/datastore#pi1000 (accessed 7 July 2010).
Pensions & Investments (2010b) The P&I 1000. Pensions & Investments, 38(3): 13.
Previtero, A. (2010) Stock market returns and annuitization. Working Paper.
Saku, A. (2005) Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the retirement
equity act. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9–10): 1699–1717.
Scholz, J. K., Seshadri, A. and Khitatrakun, S. (2006) Are Americans saving ‘optimally’ for
retirement? Journal of Political Economy, 114(4): 607–643.
Snell, R. (2010a) Pension reform: not easy, but worth it. State Legislatures, [online] July/
August, 32–34. Available online at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=20716 (accessed 6 August
2010).
Snell, R. (2010b) State deﬁned contribution and hybrid pension plans. National Conference of
State Legislatures [online]. Available online at http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
ﬁleticket=yGsmFhwoq7E%3d&tabid=18511 (accessed 6 August 2010).
Thaler, R. H. and Benartzi, S. (2004) Save more tomorrow: using behavioral economics to
increase employee savings. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1): S164–S187.
Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans 335U.S. Census Bureau (2008) Number and Membership of State and Local Public Employee
Retirement Systems by State: Fiscal Year 2008. Available online at http://www.census.gov/
govs/retire/2008ret05a.html (accessed 4 August 2010).
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) National Compensation Survey:
Employee Beneﬁts in Private Industry in the United States, 2005. Available online at http://
www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebbl0022.pdf (accessed 18 January 2011).
U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Beneﬁt Security Administration (2008) Private
Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables. Available online at: http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
privatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf (accessed 13 December 2007).
U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Beneﬁt Security Administration (2010) Private Pension
Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2007 Form 5500 Annual Reports. Available online at: http://
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2007pensionplanbulletin.pdf (accessed 4 August 2010).
Yaari, M. E. (1965) Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. Review
of Economic Studies, 32(2): 137–150.
Yang, T. S. (2005) Understanding the deﬁned beneﬁt versus deﬁned contribution choice.
Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2005–4.
336 John Beshears et al.